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THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
1968-1969
The Minnesota Supreme Court Note comprehensively sur-
veys significant decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court [here-
inafter referred to as the Minnesota court or simply the court]
from October 1, 1968, to September 30, 1969. The cases selected
were thought to represent new developments in Minnesota law
and also to present perplexing questions common to most juris-
dictions; accordingly the decisions have been evaluated in terms
of Minnesota law but the Minnesota court's results have fre-
quently been compared with the law of other jurisdictions so
that the analysis is universally applicable. Also there are some
"Case Briefs" of less significant decisions which may be of gen-
eral interest to the Minnesota Bar. While the cases are discussed
separately they are arranged according to the general legal issue
involved. In addition the Note presents statistics on recent oper-
ations of the court.
THE TABLES [1968-1969] *
The data contained in the following Tables summarize the
work of the Minnesota Supreme Court from October, 1968 to Oc-
tober, 1969. So that the reader can evaluate these Tables com-
prehensively, a statement of their purposes and bases is pre-
sented here.
Tables I, II and III concentrate primarily on patterns of
opinion-writing and voting among the individual justices. Table
I tabulates the written opinions of each justice according to the
disposition represented and categorizes the number of votes cast
by him, indicating abstentions as well as dissents. The data for
opinions written and for absences reflect the operation of the cur-
rent system of divisional sittings. Table II lists the total number
of opinions delivered during the period and classifies them ac-
cording to whether the opinion was unanimous, per curiam or
with a dissent or concurrence. This table also indicates the num-
ber of opinions delivered under the divisional sitting system.
Table III endeavors to determine the alignment among the jus-
tices by measuring the extent of their disagreements. It records
* The text and Tables immediately following were prepared un-
der the supervision of Professor Charles W. Wolfram of the Law School
in connection with his study of the caseload of the Minnesota Supreme
Court.
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the number of instances in which the justices voted for opposite
dispositions plus the number of instances in which the justices
voted for the same disposition but did not join in an opinion.
Table III includes per curiam dispositions as well as signed opin-
ions; it necessarily excludes, however, the division created in one
case where an "equally divided" court affirmed the trial court
in a per curiam decision that did not identify majority and dis-
senting justices.'
Table IV categorizes by origin all of the opinions announced
by the court during the period. The primary purpose is to
show the approximate number of cases appealed from each judi-
cial district, commission, department or board and the number of
cases that originated in the court itself. For this purpose, per
curiam decisions and cases dismissed without consideration of
the merits are counted as dispositions. The cases that originated
in the supreme court are subdivided depending upon whether
the court was reviewing the action of a lower court or agency
or whether the case involved an entirely original proceeding in
the supreme court. Table IV also indicates the disposition or-
dered where the court's decision explicitly required further con-
sideration by the originating court or agency. In some instances,
of course, further consideration might have been required even
though no specific statement to this effect is contained in the
opinion; such cases are not included, in the "further disposition"
data.
Table V indicates the general subject matter of the action
that gave rise to the opinion of the court (not necessarily the
same as the principal issue decided by the court). The enumer-
ation includes cases originating in the court itself. In areas of
high interest or frequent occurrence and which lend themselves
to this treatment, the subjects are subdivided to indicate the
subject matter more specifically. Table V is also designed to in-
dicate the relative success of appeals by defendants and plaintiffs
in the several kinds of cases. Since relative success in the im-
mediate appeal is not always accurately measured by affirmance
or reversal, the denomination of the result as "successful" or
"unsuccessful" for the petitioning party has been employed.
1. Riley v. Riley, 282 Minn. 527, 162 N.W.2d 723 (1968).
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TABLE I
(1968-1969)
ACTION OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES
Opinions VJritten Votes
18 p :i co 0
co r. 0
"
~• w
Knutson, C.J. - 0 13 0 0 13 295 1 6 2
Nelson, J. 26 11 0 1 38 204 2 98 0
Murphy, J. 22 11 0 0 33 215 1 87 1
Otis, J. 18 11 1 2 32 211 2 88 2
Rogosheske, J. __ 26 8 4 1 39 227 1 76 0
Sheran, J. 24 16 0 1 41 220 2 82 2
Peterson, J. - - 19 10 2 2 33 210 2 90 2
Gallagher, J. - 25 4 0 0 29 b b 95 2
Per Curiam -____ 49 11 60
Totals -304 209 95 7 7 318 11 622 11
a Includes concurrences.
b But see Riley v. Riley, 282 Minn. 527, 162 N.W.2d 723 (1968), where
the court, apparently en banc, stated in a per curiam opinion, "The mem-
bers of the Court being equally divided, the order of the lower court is
affirmed without opinion .... "
TABLE II
(1968-1969)
CLASSIFICATION OF WRITTEN OPINIONS
Number of Cases Percentage of Total
o .0
P 0 •
Unanimous -- 158 73 231 52.0 24.0 76.0
With Concurrence
Only 2 5 7 .06 1.65 2.3
With Dissent __ 0 7a 7a .0 2.3 2.3
Per Curiam -- 49 11a  60a 16.1 3.3 19.4
Totals 209 96a 305a 68.2 30.8 100.0
a Totals more than 304 cases because of the inclusion at two points of
one per curiam decision that had a dissent. See Table I, note b.
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TABLE II.*
(1968-1969)
ALIGNIVENT OF ,J'USTICES
0
0w U2
00
0 0 0
0- P4 0 0.-
D 3 3 2 1 2 2
C 2 0 4 2 0 0
Knutson_ T 5 3 6 3 2 2
N 206 210 220 203 204 194
D 3 0 2 3 0
C 1 0 4 2 0
Nelson T 4 0 6 5 0
N 125 123 133 162 168
D 3 0 2 3
C 1 0 4 2
Murphy_-- T 4 0 6 5
N 132 134 150 165
D 4 4 3
C 2 1 4
Otis.- T 6 5 7
N 134 140 167
D 1 3
C 5 3
Rogosheske- T 6 6
N 181 197
D 3
C 2
Sheran---- T
N 192
* 'D" represents decisions of the court in which the justices voted for
opposite results. "C" represents decisions in which the justices voted
for the same result, but did not join together in an opinion. "T" repre-
sents the total number of decisions in which the justices did not join
together in an opinion, i.e., the total number of decisions on which theSustices disagreed. "N" represents the total number of decisions in which
both justices participated. The table includes per curiam opinions.
[Vol. 54:10891092
MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
TABLE IV
(1968-1969)
SOURCE AND DISPOSITION OF CASES APPEALED
Disposition DispositionOrdered
District 0 M r.
1st Judi-
cialDist. - - 1 21 9 11ab  1 1 2
2nd " 2 57 42ed 13e 2 6 2
3rd" - 3 16 12 4 2
4th " 4 87 64f 20hi 3 8 5
5th" - 5 13 11 2 1
6th" __ 6 12 9 3 1
7th " 7 9 6 1 2 1
8th " 8 16 10 6J 2 1
9th " - 9 27 19 7 1 1 3
10th " 10 18 14f 4k 3 1
Tax Court - - 2 1 1
Workmen's
Compensation
Commission _ - 20 151 5
M
Board of Health -__ 1 1
Public Service
Commission - 1 1
Employment Security
Commission - 1 1
Total - 301 214 78 9 - 25 15
Supreme Court
Original Non Review Review Absolute Discharged
Prohibition 6 4 2
Mandamus 1 1
Certification 4 1 3n
Certiorari 22 5 17
Discipline 3 3
Total 304 33 14 22
a Includes one case that was reversed with a remittitur ordered.
b Includes one case that was reversed and remanded in part and af-
firmed in part.
C Includes three cases that were affirmed and remanded.
d Includes three cases that were affirmed in part and reversed in part.
e Includes two cases that were remanded without being reversed.
f Includes one case that was affirmed in part and reversed in part.
g Includes one case that was affirmed as modified.
h Includes two cases that were reversed in part and affirmed in part.(Table IV footnotes continued on next page.)
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TABLE V
(1968-1969)
SUBJECT OF UNDERLy.mNG DIsPUTE
Disposition on Appeal
Appealed by Appealed by
Plaintiff Defendant
Subject Matter 0 U
Contracts 30
Lease 3 2 1
Construction 2 2
Personal Service 4 1 1 2
Sale-Realty 6 3 3
Sale-Other 7 1 1 5
Other-Business 7 2 1 4
Other-Non-
Business 1 1
Corporations &
Securities 3 3 2 1
Creditor Security 6
Priority 1 1Mechanics' Lien
Foreclosure 4 2 2
Mortgage Fore-
closure 1 1
Criminal Law 71
Appeal 46 1 9 36
Habeas Corpus 25 3 22
Domestic Relations __ 17
Divorce 13 2 2 3 6
Adoption/Custody - 4 1 1 2
Insurance 20
Motor Vehicle 8 3 2 3
Annuity 3 2 1
Property Casualty - 1 1
Accident &
Disability 2 1 1
Other 6 2 2 2
i Includes only one case that was remanded for a new trial on the issue
of damages only.
i Includes one case that was reversed in. part and affirmed in part.k Includes one case that was remanded with directions to dismiss.
1 Includes one case that was affirmed with directions.
m Includes one case that was remanded without being reversed.
n Includes one case in which the writ of prohibition was dismissed on
grounds of mootness.
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Labor Law - _ 6
Public Em-
ployee 6
Property 30
Assessment 9
Eminent Domain 10
Title 7
Zoning 4
Regulatory Agency 13
Attorney Discipline - 3
Health 2
Medical Licensing - 2
Public Service _ 1
Transportation 5
State and Local
Government - 6
School Districts ___ 2
Operations 2
City Annexation - 2
Taxation 1
Income 1
Torts 68
Motor Vehicle
Negligence 33
Product Lia-
bility 2
Civil Damage Act -- 1
Fraud 3
Other 29
Trusts & Estates _ 6
Charitable
Foundations 1
Decedents' Estates-
Administration - 1
Guardianship 1
Wills 3
Welfare 1
Unemployment
Compensation 1
Workmen's Compen-
sation 21 21
Not Identified 5 5
Total ___304 304
3 1 2
6 1 2
4 4 2
2 4 1
2 2
1 1 2
1 12
7
2
3
11 4 11
1 1
1
9 4
1
1
1 12
2
30 84
1
4 4
3
51 139
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Civil Procedure: Plaintiff Consenting to
Remittitur Held to Retain Right to Review
of Reduction of Verdict on Cross..Appeal
Plaintiffs received a jury verdict in the amount of $219.15
for damages resulting from an automobile accident.1 The trial
court, finding that the issues were not determined in an atmos-
phere free from passion or prejudice,2 granted plaintiffs' motion
for a new trial on the issue of damages. In the second trial, the
jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs in the amount of $23,219.15.
Defendants' motion for a new trial on the ground that the dam-
ages were excessive was denied upon the condition that plain-
tiffs agree to remit $9,219.15. Plaintiffs did so, and judgment
was entered accordingly. Defendants appealed from that judg-
ment, contending that the court erred after the first trial in
granting plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. Plaintiffs, on cross-
appeal, asked for a review of the judgment and of the condi-
tional nature of the order denying defendants' motion for a new
trial. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that plaintiffs who
have consented to a remittitur3 have the right to have the reduc-
tion of the verdict reviewed on cross..appeal. 4 Jangula v. Klocek,
1. Plaintiff Angeline Jangula sought to recover damages for her-
niation of a lumbar disc. Her husband, Bernard, sought to recover for
damages to his automobile, Angeline's medical expenses and conse-
quential damages.
2. MAmN. R. Civ. P. 59.01 (1968) states:
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on
all or part of the issues for any of the following causes:
(5) excessive or insufficient damages, appearing to have
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
In the opinion of the trial court, three matters occurred that might
have prejudiced the jury against the plaintiffs: the disclosure of the
illegitimacy of the plaintiff's first child, the disclosure of the hospitali-
zation of the wife, Angeline, shortly after the accident for an overdose
of sleeping pills and the introduction of the hospital records containing
a nurse's note with her diagnosis that Angeline had cigarette burns on
her body at the time of admission. Jangula v. Klocek, 170 N.W.
2d 587, 591 (1969).
3. Remittitur is defined as
the plaintiff's exercise of an option given to him by the trialjudge to reduce the amount of the verdict when the damages
awarded by the jury appear to the judge to be excessive and to
agree to an order allowing the verdict to stand for the residue.
BALLENTN's LAW DICTIONARY 1115-116 (2d ed. 1948).
For a discussion of the origin of the term remittitur see Holbrook v.
Quinlan & Co., 84 Vt. 411, 80 A. 339 (1911). For a historical back-
ground on remittitur in England and Amunerica see Dimick v. Schiedt,
293 U.S. 474 (1935).
4. The court refused to reinstate the verdict or alter the remittitur
1096 [Vol. 54:1096
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- Minn. -, 170 N.W.2d 587 (1969).
It is well settled that a trial court can deny a motion for a
new trial conditioned upon plaintiff's remitting a specific sum
from the verdict.5 The trial court may not, however, reduce
the amount of the jury's verdict without giving the prevailing
party an option to submit to a new trial. If the plaintiff does
not consent to the remittitur, the trial court may set aside the
verdict and award a new trial.6
If plaintiff accepts the remittitur, he is precluded from ap-
pealing the amount of the judgment awarded to him. Even
when defendant appeals, a substantial majority of courts will
preclude review of the amount of the judgment conditioned upon
remittitur.7  No substantial justification has been advanced by
any court in support of this preclusion. The courts have found
that plaintiff has "waived his right of appeal" by accepting the
because the trial court had not abused its discretion. On the defendants'
appeal the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial after the first trial.
5. See Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Mining Co., 158 U.S. 41
(1895); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642 (1886); Mills v.
Scott, 99 U.S. 25 (1878); Kugling v. Williamson, 231 Minn. 135, 42 N.W.
2d 534 (1950).
Where the amount of damages awarded under a verdict is exces-
sive and such excess appears to have been given under the influ-
ence of passion and prejudice, but the verdict in other respects is
substantially correct and reasonably appears not to have been
influenced by passion or prejudice, the trial court in the exer-
cise of a sound discretion may deny a new trial upon the condi-
tion that plaintiff remit such sum as shall, in the judgment of the
court, eliminate the element of excessiveness.
231 Minn. at 142, 42 N.W.2d at 539.
6. See Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889). The constitution-
ality of the practice of remittitur has been questioned. Carlin, Remittitur
and Additurs, 49 W. Va. L.Q. 1 (1942). But the Supreme Court, in
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935), stated:
[I]t, therefore, may be that if the question of remittitur were
now before us for the first time, it would be decided otherwise.
But ... the doctrine has been accepted as the law for more than
a hundred years and uniformly applied in the federal courts
during that time. And, as it finds some support in the practice
of the English courts prior to the adoption of the Constitution,
we may assume that in a case involving a remittitur, which
this case does not, the doctrine would not be reconsidered or
disturbed at this late day.
Id. at 484-85.
Additur, the increasing of an inadequate award by the court on plaintiff's
motion for a new trial, was held unconstitutional in the federal courts
as a violation of the seventh amendment. Id. Contra, Genzel v. Halvor-
son, 248 Minn. 527, 80 N.W.2d 854 (1957).
7. See Bessemer v. Brantley, 258 Ala. 675, 65 So. 2d 160 (1953);
Florida E. Coast Ry. v. Ruckles, 83 Fla. 599, 92 So. 159 (1922); Adres
v. Green, 7 Ill. App. 2d 375, 129 N.E.2d 430 (1955). For an extensive
discussion of the common law see Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 1327 (1967).
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remittitur,8 or the acceptance is regarded as a voluntary act,
which is binding on plaintiff in the future. Courts no longer
attempt to justify the rationale of the rule, but merely rely
on the numerous precedents that have supported the rule in the
past.1 0
A few states allow review of the consent to a remittitur
under a statute"1 or rule of procedure.12 It was not until 1963,
however, with the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision of Plesko
v. Milwaukee,' 3 that any court chose to modify the old common
law position. In Plesko, the jury awarded plaintiff a verdict of
$9,950.00. The trial court offered plaintiff the option of accept-
ing a remittitur of $4,450.00 or a new trial limited to the question
of damages. The remittitur was accepted by plaintiff, and de-
fendant appealed. On appeal plaintiff asked for a review of the
trial court's determination that (1) the jury award was excessive,
and (2) $5,500.00 was a reasonable judgment upon which to give
plaintiff the option to accept a rernAttitur or have a new trial
limited to damages. Defendant asserted that plaintiff was pre-
cluded from raising these issues because of the acceptance of a
judgment of $5,500.00. The Plesko court, in holding that the
common law should be limited to situations in which the plain-
tiff appeals directly, stated:
[W]hen an opposing party appeals, the party who has accepted
the option to take judgment for such a reduced amount of dam-
ages may nevertheless have a review on appeal of the trial
court's determination of the damages issue.' 4
The Wisconsin court expressed two reasons for its modifi-
8. Clarke v. Meigs, 23 N.Y. Super. Ct. 337 (1863).
9. A common attitude stated is that plaintiffs "elected to enter
remittiturs. They were not compelled to do so. By entering remittiturs
they acquiesced in the action of the trial court and having done so they
are now without cause to complain." Andres v. Green, 7 Ill. App. 2d
375, 384, 129 N.E.2d 430, 434 (1955).
10. See, e.g., Carver v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry., 362 Mo. 897,
245 S.W.2d 96 (1952).
11. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRuc. § 584(a) (McKinney 1963); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-1929 (1964); TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-118 (1956). A typical
example states: "[A] party who consents to a remittitur as a condition
to the denial of a new trial is not thereby precluded from asserting on
appeal by the opposite party, that the amount of the verdict was proper."
TL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 68.1(7) (1965). Illinois, New York, Nebraska
and Texas allow cross-appeals only. Tennessee allows plaintiff to appeal
if the remittitur was accepted under protest.
12. See, e.g., TEx. R. Civ. P. 328 (1966).
13. 19 Wis. 2d 210, 120 N.W.2d 130 (1963). The old common law
rule has been expressed in Burmek v. :Miller Brewing Co., 12 Wis. 2d
405, 107 N.W.2d 583 (1961).
14. 19 Wis. at 220, 120 N.W.2d at 135.
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cation of the common law: (1) to prevent unfairness to a party
who accepts remittitur, and (2) to discourage a multitude of ap-
peals. As to the former point, the court pointed out that plain-
tiff's underlying objective in accepting remittitur is to avoid
the expense, delay and uncertainty of outcome of a new trial.
This objective is negated when plaintiff, after accepting the re-
mittitur, is forced to undergo an appeal by the action of the
opposing party. The court felt that it was unfair to prevent a
review of the trial court's reduction of damages, especially when
plaintiff accepted remittitur only to avoid additional delay and
expense. Under the latter point the court felt that the party
held liable will now be more hesitant to appeal because of the
possibility that the party who has accepted remittitur may pre-
vail on his motion for a review and have the jury verdict rein-
stated."; This argument in support of modification of the com-
mon law is questionable. Appeals are given as a matter of right
to correct error. It is arguable that parties should not be dis-
couraged from attacking error because of court attitudes on
finality of judgment. Courts have been reluctant to accept such
an argument, however, as is evidenced by their continued en-
couragement of settlement at the trial level.
In Jangula, the Minnesota Supreme Court specifically
adopted the Plesko rule.16  Jangula, however, specifically re-
served the issue of review on plaintiff-initiated appeals. 17 Tech-
nically, this is quite proper since that question was not before
the court. This issue, however, casts a degree of confusion into
any further developments in this area of the law.
It is probable, should the issue arise, that the Minnesota
court will not review plaintiff-initiated appeals. This conclusion
is supported in three ways. (1) Recent Wisconsin cases have
limited Plesko to cross-appeals only.'8 Since Jangula specifically
adopted the Plesko rule, it is logical to assume that Minnesota
courts will continue to follow the Wisconsin courts in limiting
Plesko to cross-appeals. (2) Most state statutes or rules of pro-
cedure that provide for a review of remittitur on appeal limit
15. Id. at 221, 120 N.W.2d at 135.
16. "[W]e adopt the rule adopted by the Wisconsin court in the
Plesko case," 170 N.W.2d at 594.
17. Id. at 594.
18. See Merlino v. Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 23 Wis. 2d 571, 127
N.W.2d 741 (1964); Lewandowski v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 33
Wis. 2d 69, 146 N.W.2d 505 (1966); Bash v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.,
38 Wis. 2d 440, 157 N.W.2d 634 (1968).
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the review to cross-appeals.19 It seems doubtful that the judi-
ciary would go beyond the modifications accomplished through
statute or rule of procedure. (3) The policy reasons for the
modification 20 do not extend to plaintiff-initiated appeals. The
unfairness in the common law rule will not be present since any
further delay and expense would be attributed to plaintiff him-
self. In addition, it is obvious that any desire on the part of the
court to discourage appeals will not be furthered by allowing
plaintiff to initiate an appeal from a judgment that he agreed to
accept.
Although Jangula must be viewed as a defeat for defend-
ants, its bark might be worse than its bite. Courts will now
listen to plaintiff's cross-appeal, but a reinstatement of the ver-
dict will be rare. Plaintiff must be able to show a clear abuse of
discretion by the trial court in reducing the jury award.21 To
find such, the reviewing court must decide that a judicial mind,
in consideration of all the circumstances and the relevant rules
of law applicable to the case, could not have reasonably reached
the conclusion of which complaint is made.22 "Ordinarily the
appellate court merely approves an amount fixed by the trial
court. '23 The allowance of cross-ap-peal, however, will provide
plaintiff with one important weapon. Even a slight possibility
19. See note 11 supra.
20. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
21. 170 N.W.2d at 594.
22. See Davis v. Davis, 78 Ariz. 174, 277 P.2d 261 (1954) (specially
concurring opinion).
23. Carlin, supra note 6, at 7. Since Plesko, in every case concern-
ing review of remittiturs, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has found either
that the cross-appeals were not timely or that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion. See Lee v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 20 Wis. 2d
333, 122 N.W.2d 374 (1963) (notice of review served too late); Merlino
v. Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 23 Wis. 2d 571, 127 N.W.2d 741 (1964)
($16,000 reduced to $4,500 was no abuse of discretion by trial court);
Rivera v. Wollin, 30 Wis. 2d 305, 140 N.W.2d 748 (1966) (notice of re-
view not filed in time); Lewandowski v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co.,
33 Wis. 2d 69, 146 N.W.2d 505 (1966) ($32,000 reduced to $20,000 was no
abuse of discretion); Bash v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 38 Wis. 2d
440, 157 N.W.2d 634 (1968) ($8,500 reduced to $4,150 was no abuse of
discretion). Courts in those states which have statutes or a rule of
procedure seem to find more readily an abuse of discretion by the trial
court. See, e.g., Small v. Bastian, 96 I1. App. 2d 195, 238 N.E.2d 155
(1968) ($20,000 reduced to $5,000 was an abuse of discretion-verdict
reinstated); Mangiameli v. Ariana, 126 Neb. 629, 253 N.W. 87 (1934)
($15,000 reduced to $7,500 was an abuse of discretion-remittitur reduced
from one-half to one-third); Miller v. Lucey, 223 App. Div. 567, 229
N.Y.S. 425 (1928) ($8,000 reduced to $6,000 was an abuse of discretion-
verdict reinstated).
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of reinstatement of the verdict will force defendants to weigh
their cases more carefully before deciding to appeal.
The decision, viewed as a whole, quite properly adopts the
liberal minority view as stated in Plesko. The court should now
settle the question of plaintiff's ability to initiate an appeal of
the reduction of the verdict after his acceptance of remittitur.
The proper resolution of that question should follow Wisconsin's
common law position, and disallow direct appeal after acceptance
of remittitur. The motivating reasons expressed by the Wis-
consin and Minnesota courts-the unfairness to plaintiff and the
discouragement of appeals--cannot support any extension of the
Plesko and Jangula rules to allow plaintiff-initiated appeals.
Constitutional Law: Due Process Does Not
Require Formal Hearing Prior to Disciplinary
Suspension of Public Employee
The Minneapolis City Charter' and the rules of the Minne-
apolis Civil Service Commission2 both authorize disciplinary sus-
pension of a city employee for up to 90 days without a formal
hearing. Plaintiff, a Minneapolis police officer, was suspended
by the chief of police for 14 days without being given such a hear-
ing. Prior to suspending plaintiff, however, the chief of police
had announced procedures which provided police officers with
a hearing prior to disciplinary suspension.3 Plaintiff instituted
1. MINmEAPors, MINN., CiTY CHARTRm ch. 19, § 11 (1960):
No officer or employee after six months' continuous employment
shall be removed or discharged except for cause, upon written
charges and after an opportunity to be heard in his own de-
fense... Nothing in this chapter shall limit the power of any
officer to suspend a subordinate for a reasonable period, not
exceeding ninety days, for purposes of discipline.
2. M qNEAPoIs CImm SERv. Coifn'~rN R. 10.01:
Any employee in the classified service may be suspended for
disciplinary purposes for a reasonable period, but such suspen-
sion shall not be for a period in excess of ninety (90) calendar
days nor except for some offense committed by the employee
so suspended. Any employee so suspended is not entitled to a
hearing.
Cited in 283 Minn. at 349-50, 168 N.W.2d at 21.
3. Order of Minneapolis Superintendent of Police of Oct. 13, 1966:
In order to have an established and orderly procedure in
disciplinary matter, the Superintendent of Police has the respon-
sibility of conducting a thorough and complete investigation of
the matter of complaint. ...
After the officer interview or pre-hearing, the formal hear-
ing notice will be served on the officer orally or in writing,
19701 1101
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an action to restrain the chief of police from suspending him.
In affirming dismissal of the action, the Minnesota Supreme
Court held, (1) that the suspension of an employee of the city
for disciplinary purposes without a formal hearing does not of-
fend the due process provisions of the state and federal consti-
tutions, and (2) that the power and duty of the Minneapolis
chief of police to suspend employees for disciplinary purposes
are fixed by the City Charter and the rules of the Minneapolis
Civil Service Commission, and are unaffected by the police chief's
own order announcing procedures he would follow. Wilson v.
Minneapolis, 283 Minn. 348, 168 N.W.2d 19 (1969).
Until recent years, courts had refrained from applying the
procedural protections of fourteenth amendment due process 4
to a government employee's interest in maintaining his job.
These courts concluded by process of elimination, that since gov-
ernment employment is neither "property," nor "liberty," nor
"life," it cannot be an interest protected by the due process
clause. 5 Interests which were considered unworthy of due pro-
cess protection were labeled as mere "privileges" rather than
"rights." Recent cases, however, have rejected this narrow in-
terpretation, and have applied procedural protections to indi-
vidual interests which, strictly speaking, are not life, liberty or
property.7
The broader interpretation of the fourteenth amendment is
founded on the notion that an individual has many interests
which are at least as important as, if not more important than,
traditionally protected forms of property,8 and that therefore
the spirit of the due process clause requires that procedural pro-
and the formal hearing will be held at least twenty-four hours
later.
Cited in 283 Minn. at 350-51, 168 N.W.2d at 21-22.
4. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HARv. L.
REv. 193, 224 (1956); see, e.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 57
(D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S.
918 (1951).
6. E.g., United States ex rel. KnaufE v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537
(1950). See Davis, supra note 5, at 222.
7. Camerena v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 9 Ariz. App. 120, 124,
449 P.2d 957, 961 (1969), where the court noted the present trend:
Although courts have traditionally adhered to the strict applica-
tion of the privilege-right distinction in relation to the due
process requirements of a hearing, there is a growing number
of cases which depart from this rigid doctrine and apply
constitutional principles of procedural fairness even though
only a privilege is involved.
8. Reich, The New Property, 73 YAmx L.J. 733, 739 (1964).
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tections must be applied to these interests, even if they are only
privileges.9 An analogy has been drawn to the tort doctrine that
although a bystander owes no duty to assist someone in peril, if
he does act, he must exercise reasonable care.1 0 Similarly, it is
argued, the fact that an individual is not entitled to a certain
benefit from the government as a matter of right does not justify
the government's unfair withdrawal of the privilege once the
government has extended the privilege to him.1
Rather than categorizing an interest as either a "right" or a
"privilege," proponents of expanded due process protection
would weigh the opposing interests of the individual and the
government. They see the fourteenth amendment as guaran-
teeing that a person who has a sufficient interest at stake in a
governmental determination be entitled to know and meet un-
favorable evidence of adjudicative facts in a fair hearing, except
in the rare circumstance when another interest is overriding.12
The interests of the parties, along with the circumstances of the
case, determine not only whether due process requires a hear-
ing, but also what minimum procedural requirements the hear-
ing, if required, must satisfy.13 Examples of expanded due pro-
cess protection can be found in cases involving the termination
by the government of such "privileges" as government employ-
ment,14 welfare benefits,'5 and attendance at publicly supported
colleges and universities.' 6
Many courts which require due process protection when a
"privilege" is terminated also require due process protection
when the same interest is merely suspended. Although Dixon
9. E.g., Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 559
(1956); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 155, 158
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ.,
200 F. Supp. 174, 178 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
10. Davis, supra note 5, at 225-26.
11. Id.; Camerena v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 9 Ariz. App.
120, 124, 449 P.2d 957, 961 (1969).
12. Davis, supra note 5, at 199; see, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360
U.S. 474, 496 (1959); Camerena v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 9 Ariz.
App. 120, 122, 449 P.2d 957, 959 (1969).
13. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
163 (1951) (concurring opinion); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.,
294 F.2d 150, 155 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
14. E.g., Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
15. E.g., Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Cam-
erena v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 9 Ariz. App. 120, 449 P.2d 957
(1969).
16. E.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
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v. Alabama State Board of Education,17 the landmark case ex-
tending due process protection to students, was concerned only
with the student's interest in not being expelled from school,
cases since Dixon have declared that some form of hearing is
necessary before a student may be given a long-term suspen-
sion,18 and in one case, before a student could be suspended for
as little as 13 days.1 9 However, other courts, while recognizing
that revocations or terminations of certain interests are pro-
tected by the due process clause, have refused to extend this
protection to suspension of the same interest.
20
On the constitutional question, the Wilson court cited four
cases in support of the conclusion that the suspension of a city
employee for disciplinary purposes without a formal hearing does
not offend due process. Two of the cited cases 21 were decided
on the ground that public employment is not a "property" right
and therefore is not protected by tae due process clause. In
the other two cases,22 the courts de-emphasized the right-privi-
lege dichotomy and instead weighed the competing interests of
the employee and the government. The Wilson court distin-
guished cases cited by the plaintiff defining due process in dis-
charge proceedings by holding that such considerations were not
relevant to a mere disciplinary suspension.
23
Neither the language of the opinion nor the authority cited
by the court indicate clearly the reasoning behind the court's
handling of the due process question. Berg v. Minneapolis,
24
the only Minnesota decision cited on the issue, was decided
17. Id.
18. Wright v. Texas Southern Univ., 392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968)
(indefinite suspension); Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F. Supp. 161 (W.
D. Mo. 1968) (suspension for entire school year); Knight v. State Bd. of
Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961) (indefinite suspension).
19. Stricklin v. Regents of Univ. of Wis., 297 F. Supp. 416, 419
(W.D. Wis. 1969). In Marzette v. McPhee, 294 F. Supp. 562 (W.D. Wis.
1968), wherein college students had been disciplinarily suspended for
two weeks pending a formal hearing, the same court ordered the stu-
dents reinstated because the temporary suspension had been imposed and
continued without due process.
20. Silver v. McCamey, 221 F.2d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (tem-
porary suspension of taxi-cab operator's license); see Pool v. Williams,
280 Ala. 337, 339, 194 So. 2d 87, 88-89 (1967) (suspension of public em-
ployee).
21. Berg v. Minneapolis, 274 Minn. 277, 143 N.W.2d 200 (1966);
Yantsin v. City of Aberdeen, 54 Wash. 2d 787, 345 P.2d 178 (1959).
22. Miller v. Tulsa, 353 P.2d 705 (Okla. 1960); State ex rel. Curtis v.
Steinkellner, 247 Wis. 1, 18 N.W.2d 355 (194.5).
23. 283 Minn. at 353, 168 N.W.2d at 23.
24. 274 Minn. 277, 143 N.W.2d 200 (1966).
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on the ground that public employment is a privilege, not a
right.25 If the court decided Wilson strictly on the basis of this
right-privilege analysis, the decision is out of step with the con-
temporary trend of evaluating the individual interests in terms
of their true worth rather than in terms of labels.26
The Wilson court held that the disciplinary suspension of a
city employee without a formal hearing does not offend due
process.2 7  The plaintiff had two separate interviews with the
police chief after receiving notice of his suspension, but prior
to its taking effect.28 If the Wilson court based its decision on
this fact, the stated holding may be meritorious. However, if
the holding is read to imply that the suspended employee is not
entitled to any kind of hearing, the decision may be trouble-
some.2 9 Since the minimum requirements necessary to satisfy
due process are influenced by all the interests and circumstances
involved,30 the issue in each case is whether, in view of the
particular conflicting interests, due process demands any proce-
dural protections. To say that due process does not require a
formal hearing is not to say that the employee is not entitled
to any opportunity to be heard before he is suspended.
It has been held, in the context of an interim suspension of
a college student pending a formal disciplinary hearing, that
procedural due process requires that the student have some im-
mediate opportunity, "however brief and however limited," to
persuade the suspending authority that there is a case of mis-
taken identity or that there was extreme provocation or that
there is some other compelling justification for withholding the
suspension.31 Although admittedly different interests are in-
25. Id. at 281, 143 N.W.2d at 203.
26. See, e.g., Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174, 178
(M.D. Tenn. 1961).
27. 283 Minn at 352, 168 N.W.2d at 22.
28. See Brief for Appellant at 2, Wilson v. Minneapolis, 168 N.W.
2d 19 (1969).
29. In Wilson "formal hearing" means one which includes:(a) notice reasonably calculated to apprise a party of charges
against him and afford him opportunity to prepare a defense
to such charges; (b) a right of confrontation, cross-examination,
and representation by counsel; (c) preparation of a written
record of the proceedings; and (d) determination of the validity
of the charges in an impartial manner.
Id.
30. Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163
(1951) (concurring opinion); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.,
294 F.2d 150, 155 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
31. See Stricklin v. Regents of Univ. of Wis., 297 F. Supp. 416, 420-21
(W.D. Wis. 1969).
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volved in a public employment case, the same sort of protection
should be extended to public employees. It is difficult to see
how either the interest in efficient administration of the police
department or in a well-disciplined police force would be harmed
by guaranteeing the policeman this fundamental sort of hearing.
Furthermore, fair treatment for policemen is also in the govern-
ment's best interest, since it would have a beneficial effect on
police morale.32 Had the Wilson court expressly adopted the
notion that due process requires some fundamental opportunity
to be heard, it could easily have decided that the employee's right
was satisfied by the two preliminary meetings with the police
chief.
It is difficult, in this age of increasing due process protec-
tion, to imagine a future court allowing a city employee to lose
90 days' salary without a hearing. But Wilson, which involved
only a 14 day suspension, gives no indication of what the longest
permissible suspension would be. The City Charter and the Civil
Service Commission rules both state that the suspension may be
for "a reasonable period" not exceeding 90 days.33 A court
wishing to establish an upper limit somewhere below the 90
day limit could use the "reasonable period" language to do so.
This "reasonable period" limitation could be either a constitu-
tional limit, based on due process considerations, or a more
stringent statutory limit, if the court found that the legislature
intended to afford municipal employees even more protection
than due process requires. Here again, however, Wilson offers
no clue as to what upper limit the court would set.3 4
The court's comment that maintaining discipline among sub-
ordinates is "a responsibility of special importance in the field
of law enforcement"3 5 indicates that, at least to some extent, the
court balanced the interests involved in the suspension. The
court could reasonably have decided that the public interest in
a firmly disciplined police department outweighs the individual's
32. See generally Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81
HARv. L. REV. 1045, 1081 (1968).
33. See notes 1 & 2 supra.
34. The uncertainty problem in this type of legislation is avoid-
able. The CivIL SERVIcE CHARTE AxAMNInD T for Tulsa, Okla., is an
example of legislation which both avoids problems of uncertainty and
affords city employees reasonable due process protection: "A depart-
ment head may, for misconduct, suspend an employee without pay for a
period not to exceed ten (10) days for any one offense, and not to ex-
ceed twenty (20) days in any calendar year." Cited in Miller v. Tulsa,
353 P.2d 705, 707 (Okla. 1960).
35. 283 Minn. at 352, 168 N.W.2d at 22.
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interest in not being deprived of two weeks' salary without a
formal hearing. It is therefore likely that modem courts will
read Wilson as recognizing a test based on the balancing of the
individual's interests against those of the state.
Procedures which satisfy due process requirements for the
police department, however, might not be adequate when ap-
plied to employees of some other branch of government. Also,
longer summary disciplinary suspensions might be permitted in
the police department than elsewhere. Thus, the same court
could easily decide that welfare and school suspensions without
prior hearing violate due process, since these cases involve in-
dividual and governmental interests different from those in-
volved in Wilson. Where welfare benefits are terminated, not
only is the individual's loss greater than the plaintiff's loss in
Wilson, but there is absent any public interest as strong as the
interest in a disciplined police force.36 Where a college student
has been suspended, the government cannot claim that the in-
terest in a disciplined student body is similar to that in a dis-
ciplined police force. However, a short suspension could prob-
ably be summarily imposed to protect the safety of either the
suspended student or others.37
In addition to deciding the consitutional questions in Wilson,
the court discussed the authority of the chief of police to impose
disciplinary suspensions on subordinates. The court said that
since the power of the chief to suspend employees for disci-
plinary purposes is fixed by the Minneapolis City Charter and
the rules of the Minneapolis Civil Service Commission, 38 and
since neither the charter nor the rules authorize him to guarantee
a formal hearing prior to any disciplinary suspension, 39 he there-
fore was not bound by his order to establish presuspension hear-
ings. The court considered this order a mere expression of the
chief's intention to follow certain procedures when, in the ex-
ercise of his discretion and judgment, he considered them appro-
priate.40 The court then proceeded to invoke the principle that
courts should not undertake to review the propriety of purely
36. See Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Camerena v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 9 Ariz. App. 120, 123, 449
P.2d 957, 960 (1969).
37. See Stricklin v. Regents of Univ. of Wis., 297 F. Supp. 416, 420(W.D. Wis. 1969); Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students,
53 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 365, 368 (1967).
38. 283 Minn. at 352, 168 N.W.2d at 22.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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administrative functions, such as suspensions, by governmental
agencies.4 1 The court said that this "well-established" principle
is especially appropriate with regard to the management of a
police department.42
The plaintiff in Wilson relied on Vitarelli v. Seaton43 as
authority for the proposition that the police chief must follow
the procedures established in his previous order.44 In Vitarelli
a federal employee, whose civil service status was such that he
could be discharged without cause, was discharged by the Secre-
tary of the Interior, who gave "interests of national security"
as a reason. The Secretary had earlier promulgated certain
procedures to be followed in dischaxges based on national se-
curity interests, but the petitioner was not afforded these pro-
tections. The Court declared the dismissal ineffective and held
that having chosen to proceed against the employee on security
grounds, the Secretary was bound by the regulations which he
himself had promulgated for dealing with such cases, even
though without such regulations he could have discharged the
employee summarily.
The Wilson court distinguished Vitarelli, apparently on the
ground that the police chief in Wilson, unlike the Secretary of
the Interior in Vitarelli, was not authorized to establish binding
procedural protections. 45 The Wilson court, viewing the police
chief's authority to impose disciplinary suspensions as based on
the City Charter provision and the Civil Service Commission
rules, said that the chief was not authorized to limit his discre-
tionary powers by binding himself to formal hearings.46 This
appears contrary to the view taken by the Minnesota Supreme
Court in State ex rel. Higgins v. Elsberg,47 which also concerned
the suspension authority of a municipal officer. The Elsberg
court saw the power of a department head to suspend his sub-
ordinates as being antecedent to, rather than deriving from,
both the charter provision and the civil service rules. The
Elsberg analysis was premised on the theory that in the absence
of statutory limitations, a department head has complete control
41. Id. at 353, 168 N.W.2d at 23. The principle is explained in State
ex rel. Saari v. State Civil Serv. Bd., 265 'Minn. 441, 443, 122 N.W.2d 174,
175-76 (1963).
42. 283 Minn. at 353, 168 N.W.2d at 23.
43. 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
44. See 283 Minn. at 353, 168 N.W.2d at 23.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 352, 168 N.W.2d at 22.
47. 157 Minn. 177, 195 N.W. 902 (1923).
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over the dismissal and suspension of his subordinates. The
court noted that although the Minneapolis City Charter took
away from the department head the power to discharge em-
ployees, 48 it expressly provided that his power to impose disci-
plinary suspensions of up to 90 days remained unlimited. The
court concluded that the department head therefore retains
complete power in the area of disciplinary suspensions, and that
this power can in no manner be abridged by the rules of the
Civil Service Commission.49
If, as Elsberg suggests, the department head has complete
authority over suspension policy, it would seem that he should
have complete authority over suspension procedures. Thus, if
the Wilson court had followed the Elsberg analysis, Vitarelli
would likely not have been so easily distinguished.
On the basis of the facts presented, the court's decision to
uphold the suspension was correct. However, the opinion failed
to define adequately the due process protections available to pub-
lic employees. The court should have emphasized that due
process questions must be decided by balancing the competing
interests and that an employee should have a right to an in-
formal opportunity to defend himself even though disciplinary
suspensions may be imposed without a formal hearing.
Products Liability: Res Ipsa Loquitur Held
Improper to Establish Manufacturer's Liability
for Ovenproof Dish Which Exploded
Plaintiff was injured when a glass baking dish, manufac-
turned by defendant and labeled "ovenproof," exploded as it was
being removed from the oven. In an action based upon strict
liability for breach of an implied warranty, plaintiff introduced
testimony concerning the circumstances surrounding the pur-
chase, the subsequent use of the dish, and the accident. Re-
covery was sought on the ground that an ovenproof dish should
not explode in the oven and therefore the dish was either de-
fective or unfit for the intended purpose when it left the manu-
facturer. The jury found for plaintiff and the defendant's mo-
tion for either a judgment n.o.v. or a new trial was denied
48. See note 1 supra.
49. 157 Minn. 177, 179-80, 195 N.W. 902, 902-03 (1923).
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by the trial court.1 The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the explosion did not imply a defect traceable to the
defendant and that any possible inference of such was negated
by expert testimony as to the explosion's probable cause. Kerr
v. Corning Glass Works, - Minn. -, 169 N.W.2d (1969).
Products liability law has come a great distance since Adam
and Eve fell victim to an apple which did not have the required
qualities for safe ingestion. In that case, not only did the poten-
tial plaintiffs fail to collect any damages, but were themselves
punished in a criminal action by the then existing legal system.
2
The original theory of caveat emptor imposed no liability for
products which caused injury. Eventually, plaintiffs were al-
lowed to recover either in an action for negligence or an action
for breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose. In either action, however, the plaintiff could proceed only
if he was in privity with the defendant with respect to the de-
structive article.3 The privity requirement soon became rid-
dled with exceptions 4 and eventually collapsed. 5 With the pass-
ing of the privity requirement, all that remained was to recog-
nize the manufacturer's and seller's liability as a strict one in
tort. This came in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Incorpo-
rated,6 and was subsequently recognized in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.7
1. In denying the motion for judgment n.o.v. or new trial, the trial
court stated:
[T]he jury could reasonably have found that the Pyrex baking
dish was properly used by Mrs. Kerr on six to eight occasions
over a period of six months; that there was no testimony to
compel a finding of improper handling by intermediate parties;
and that on the day in question, while proper use of it was being
made, the dish suddenly exploded ....
169 N.W.2d 587, 588 (1969). Cf. Toth v. Coming Glass Works, 411
F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1969), discussed in note -14 infra.
2. Genesis 3:1-19.
3. According to Lord Abinger, if such actions were not confined to
parties in privity, "the most absurd and outrageous consequences ...
would ensue." Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex.
1842).
4. Two prominent exceptions were that plaintiff was not required
to show privity if the product could be said to be "inherently danger-
ous" or for "intimate bodily use."
5. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 50 Mn_.N. L. REv. 791, 791-800 (1966).
6. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 337 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). Plaintiff,
injured by a defective tool, sued in warranty. The court struck down
defendant's defenses on contract principles, proclaiming that the liability
was a strict one in tort.
7. RESTTMN (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) states:
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
[Vol. 54:11091110
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Today, most jurisdictions, including Minnesota,8 have adopted
some form of strict liability theory9 either by retaining the guise
of warranty or by finding strict liability in tort.10 The theory
of strict liability frees plaintiff from proving negligence or priv-
ity. However, the mere showing by the plaintiff that he was
injured is insufficient for recovery. He must also introduce evi-
dence from which a jury can reasonably conclude: 1) that the
product was in a condition which was defective or otherwise
unsafe for use; 2) that such condition existed when the product
was sold by the defendant, and 3) that such condition was the
proximate cause of the injury." The greatest difficulties in es-
tablishing strict liability lie in proving that the product was in a
defective or unsafe condition and that such condition was attrib-
utable to the defendant.
The term most often used to describe the condition of the
product necessary for recovery is "defective." The use of
this term may suggest that a certain mechanical or structural
flaw which sets the particular unit apart from others must exist.
In practice, however, the term is used much more broadly. As
suggested by the additional but oft-omitted phrase "or other-
wise unsafe for . . . use,"'12 "defective" is properly used to de-
scribe any condition which makes the product unreasonably
dangerous to its user. This condition might exist in an individual
unit or in all products of the particular type, as in the case of an
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumer, or to his property, if(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a prod-
uct, and(b) it is exnected to and does reach the user or consumer
without -substantial change in the condition in which
it is sold.
This rule applies although:
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
8. McCormick v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d
488 (1967) (child was scalded when she tipped over vaporizer repre-
sented as "foolproof" and "tipproof"). The elements of strict liabil-
ity are those set forth in section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
ToRTs quoted, note 7 supra.
9. For a chart of strict liability theories accepted by various juris-
dictions, see 1 CCH PRODUCTS LiABmLrrY REPORTS 4060 (1969).
10. For diffe:-ences in the tort and warranty theories, see Emroch,
Testimony and Proof in a Products Liability Case, 1966 ABA SECTION
OF INsURANcE, NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAw 172.
11. See Prosser, supra note 5, at 840.
12. Id.
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unsafe design.13 The defect need not even lie with the product
alone but may be related to the state of mind of the user. Thus,
if it is shown that a product "failed to meet the reasonable ex-
pectations of its user [as to safe use of the product]," a defect
is inferred.14 The "reasonable expectations" of the user may be
influenced, of course, by representations made by the defend-
ant.15 And if the normal use of the product creates latent
dangers that the user would not normally be aware of, the manu-
facturer or seller has a duty to warn the user against these
dangers. 16 Thus, in these instances, the defendant may cure the
"defect," not by changing his manufacturing process, but by in-
forming the user of what to expect from the product. The
Minnesota court has in the past adhered to this broad definition
of "defect.' 17
At trial, the plaintiff must prove that such a defective or
unsafe condition existed in the particular product and that the
condition was attributable to the defendant. In many cases, the
object is destroyed or deformed by the ensuing accident so that
determination of the exact cause of the defect is difficult. Also,
in a time when manufacturers are large and remote, it is difficult
to trace the defect through manufacture and sale. The plain-
tiff's task would be very difficult indeed were it not for the
fact that courts allow proof by indirect; evidence.
13. See, e.g., McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154
N.W.2d 488 (1967).
14. In Toth v. Corning Glass Works, 411 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1969),
plaintiff was scalded when a coffee pol. manufactured by defendant
broke apart, spilling hot coffee on him. This breakage was due to the
spreading of a small crack apparently caused when the pot was struck
slightly during its extended period of use. Although the point was not
stressed on appeal, the court held that the jury could have found the
product "defective" in failing to stand up to the foreseeable bumping
incidental to its normal use. Since there was no direct evidence that
the plaintiffs had misused the pot, the jury was permitted to find from
the plaintiff's testimony that no misuse occurred.
15. In some cases when damage occurs, defendant may be strictly
liable for misrepresentation. See, e.g., Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168
Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, aff'd on rehearing, 15 P.2d 1118 (1932). See
generally Prosser, supra note 5, at 834:; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402B (1965).
16. Defendant may be held liable if be knew or had reason to know
that such a mishap could reasonably occur and did not warn the cus-
tomer. See, e.g., Flanery v. Terry Farris Stores, Inc., - Tex. App. -,
438 S.W.2d 864 (1969) where defendant was held liable for failure to
warn that a glass door may chip or scratch, leading to spontaneous
disintegration. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, com-
ment h (1965).
17. See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.
2d 488 (1967).
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The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been relied on exten-
sively by persons attempting to prove negligence on the part of
the manufacturer, but since negligence is not an element of
strict liability, the use of Tes ipsa would seem unnecessary in
strict liability actions. The authorities are divided, however, on
the issue of whether or not a res ipsa related concept may be
used in an attempt to show that a "defect" for which the de-
fendant is responsible was present in the product.' 8 The Minne-
sota court has been reluctant to allow a plaintiff to meet his
burden of proving a "defective" condition attributable to the
defendant by relying on res ipsa loquitur. In Jessen v. Schune-
man's, Incorporated" the court did not allow the use of res
ipsa. In so doing, it suggested that res ipsa was not applicable
to implied warranty cases, 20 and that even if it were, it could
not be used in that case since the instrumentality was not under
defendant's control at the time of the injury.21 However, an
exception had earlier been made to the requirement of defend-
ant's control at the time of the injury for an exploding carbon-
ated beverage bottle in Johnson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Com-
pany.22 The court declared that control at the time of the al-
leged negligence-that is, at the time the "defect" arose-would
suffice. The court did not explain why an exploding carbonated
beverage bottle is different from any other malfunctioning prod-
uct. And recently in Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company,
the court indicated that this exception may be broadened. 23
Regardless of whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
applied to strict liability cases, most states, including Minnesota,
allow circumstantial evidence-the heart of res ipsa-to be used
18. Compare McCurter v. Norton Co., 263 Cal. App. 2d 402, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 493 (1969), with Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 411 S.W.2d 443 (Mo.
App. 1966).
19. 246 Minn. 13, 73 N.W.2d 786 (1955). Plaintiff's wife was making
coffee in a pot manufactured and sold by defendants. When she was in
another room, she heard her daughter scream. The top half of the pot
was found lying on the floor near the child admist hot water and coffee
grounds while the bottom portion remained on the stove.
20. See also 77 C.J.S. Sales § 365 (1952).
21. The requirement of control at the time of the accident has been
much criticized and is probably no longer essential to a res ipsa case.
Control at the time of the alleged act may suffice. See RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) Or TORTS § 328D, comment g (1965); 1 CCH PRODUCTS LIA-
Bmify REPORTS f 2500, 2600 (1969).
22. 235 Minn. 471, 51 N.W.2d 573 (1952).
23. 267 Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d 557 (1964). The court intimated
that the use of res ipsa may have been allowable even though there was
no explosion of carbonated contents. The bottle was broken by an outside
force.
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in proving the essential elements.24  When circumstantial evi-
dence is used without the special designation of res ipsa loquitur,
courts seem not to be bound by the rigid res ipsa requirements,
such as control by the defendant at the time of the injury. In
Heise v. J. R. Clark Company,25 the Minnesota court allowed the
jury to consider circumstantial evidence regarding a collapsible
ladder, which plaintiff had used for seven to nine months, in
finding that the defendant negligently constructed the ladder.
In Smith v. Hencir-Nichols, Incorporated,26 the court allowed
the jury to find a "defect" in the steering gear of an auto which
defendant had sold and subsequently repaired where there were
two possible causes for the steering malfunction. Such a finding
was permitted even though defendant's mechanics testified that
in their opinion an outside force was the cause of the accident.27
In the instant case, plaintiff received the glass baking dishes
as a gift from the donor, who had purchased them at a hardware
store. After some seven months of safe use, one of the dishes
exploded as plaintiff was lifting it from the oven. Plaintiff and
donor both testified that nothing led them to believe that the
dishes would not function as expected.28 Defendant's witness, 29
a glass expert and a 30-year employee of defendant, testified that
in his opinion the explosion was caused by a "bruise check"--
a small crack often indiscernible tc. the untrained eye-in the
glass which could have been caused. by a sharp rap by a hard
instrument or the dropping of another dish from a one foot
height. On cross-examination, he admitted that the defendant's
inspectors had no formal training30 in ceramics, that some defect
probably could get by them,31 and that other dishes, broken in a
manner similar to the one in issue, had been returned to de-
24. See, e.g., Toth v. Corning Glass Works, 411 F.2d 912 (6th Cir.
1969); Trowbridge v. Abrasive Co. of :Philadelphia, 190 F.2d 825 (3d
Cir. 1951); L. FRUMER & M. FREDm , PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 12.03(9)
(d), 16.03(4) (i), 16.03(4) (b) (i) (Supp. 1968).
25. 245 Minn. 179, 71 N.W.2d 818 (1955).
26. 276 Minn. 390, 150 N.W.2d 556 (1967) (a suit based upon both
warranty and negligence).
27. The court stated that the jury could disbelieve defendant's
mechanics and their finding would not be disturbed on review. Id. at
398, 150 N.W.2d at 561.
28. Testimony of David Kerr, Francis Kerr (plaintiffs) and Edith
Kerr, Record at 1-90, Kerr v. Corning Glass Works, - Minn. -, 169
N.W.2d 587 (1969).
29. Testimony of Henman Schrickel (only defense witness), Record,
id. at 98.
30. Id. at 120.
31. Id. at 123.
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fendant.3 2
The trial court's charge expressly stated that the jury might
find for the plaintiffs if it determined that the dish was "defec-
tive" or not reasonably fit for its intended purpose when it left
the factory.33 The linnesota Supreme Court held that there was
no evidence from which the jury could find a defect in the prod-
uct attributable to defendant, that res ipsa loquitur was wrongly
applied since the dish was not in the exclusive control of the
defendant at the time of the injury, and that defendant's expert
effectively negated "the inference" that defendants had intro-
duced a tangible defect.
An important question left unanswered by the Kerr decision
is what type of unsafe condition may be considered by the jury
in holding a defendant liable. The court, citing The Fall of the
Citadel,34 states that the product must be "defective." How-
ever, the phrase "or otherwise unsafe for . . .use" which fol-
lows immediately in the article and gives the term "defective"
the broader meaning previously discussed 35 is omitted by the
court. The opinion apparently adopts a narrow view of the term
"defect." Toth, which presented facts similar to those in the
instant case,30 allowed the jury to find that the product was
"defective" in not being sturdy enough to take the foreseeable
blows of ordinary use. McCormack v. Hankscraft Company,
Incorporated,37 the leading Minnesota case in the area of strict
liability, also addressed itself to the question of fitness for fore-
seeable use and discussed at length the fact that foreseeable use
may be determined by defendant's representations of safety and
failure to warn of possible hazards. The Kerr court does not
discuss the possibility that the dish may have been unreason-
ably dangerous for ordinary use even if the supposed "bruise
check" was not present in the dish when it left the manufacturer.
The issues of defendant's representations and possible warnings
and how they affect the reasonable expectations of the user are
all absent from the opinion even though "fitness for foreseeable
use" was in issue at the trial level as evidenced by the court's
charge.38
The broader concept of "defective or otherwise unsafe for
32. Id. at 114.
33. Id. at 134, 135.
34. See Prosser, supra note 5, at 840.
35. See text accompanying notes 12-18 supra.
36. See note 14 supra.
37. 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967).
38. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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reasonable use"--the Toth rationale--would seem the better one
to follow. If a product is not misused, it should possess the
attributes which a reasonable user anticipates and certainly
those which the manufacturer claims for it. Most products com-
mon to the household are not, as a rule, treated with great care.
They are handled a great deal and commonly come in contact
with other objects, often sharply, without apparent damage. If
the manufacturer or seller knows that particular handling may
produce in the product a dangerous propensity of which the user
may not become aware, such as a virtually invisible crack which
may lead to explosion, the user should be warned so that he
may be on his guard. It is not unfair to hold a manufacturer
or seller to such a standard; especially when a representation is
made concerning the product, he has himself set the standard.
Another question raised by Kenr is what evidence may be
used for a jury to conclude that defendant is liable. The court
concluded that the theory of res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable
because the product was not in the exclusive control of the de-
fendant. By citing Jessen 9 as cont-rolling, the court appears to
say that control at the time of the accident is necessary even
though such a requirement has been criticized nearly out of
existence.4 0 The question of whether res ipsa may ever be used
in a strict liability case in Minnesota is left in doubt. The court
distinguished Johnson4A and Gardne ,-42 on the grounds that those
cases pertain only to the exploding contents of sealed carbonated
beverage containers-even though Gardner did not involve an
explosion. Thus, it is possible that res ipsa may have some fu-
ture use if only in the narrow area of exploding carbonated
beverage bottles. However, the possibility of expanding the
strict control exception as indicated by dictum in Gardner would
seem doubtful.
If the case was not tried on res ipsa, but merely on circum-
stantial evidence as it would appear from the transcript, the
strict res ipsa requirements need not; be applied. All that would
be necessary is that the balance of probabilities preponderates in
favor of defendant's liability. This theory was apparently con-
sidered by the court because they conclude that "the inference"
was negated by defendant's expert. If the court denies the use
39. 246 Minn. 13, 73 N.W.2d 786 (1955).
40. See note 1 supra.
41. 235 Minn. 471, 51 N.W.2d 573 (1952). See text accompanying
note 22 supra.
42. 267 Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d 557 (1964). See text accompanying
note 23 supra.
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of res ipsa, this "inference" could only arise from circumstantial
evidence. Not once, however, does the court use the term "cir-
cumstantial evidence."
The court's opinion in Kerr raises serious questions concern-
ing the applicability of circumstantial evidence in products lia-
bility cases and yet the court fails to provide any illumination
as to the limits of its use or indeed, whether it is to be used at
all. Clearly, this is to the detriment of potential plaintiffs. The
use of circumstantial evidence is often essential to hold a large,
remote manufacturer liable for a malfunctioning product. By
reversing a circumstantial evidence case on the basis of the non-
applicability of res ipsa loquitur without discussing the appro-
priate rules for the use of circumstantial evidence in its broad
sense, the court leaves in doubt the future value of circumstan-
tial evidence in strict liability cases.
The court's reliance upon defendant's expert is also some-
what confusing. If the court is correct in its initial holding that
there was "no evidence ... that would support an inference that
there was a defect" then the opinion could have ended there.
The court's subsequent holding that the expert testimony ne-
gated the inference of a defect presupposes that there is an infer-
ence to be negated and therefore is inconsistent with the initial
holding. The reliance would also seem to contradict the lan-
guage in Smith v. Hencir-Nichols, Incorporated43 to the effect
that the jury can choose to disbelieve defendant's employees
as to the cause of a malfunction. Also, since the evidence is to
be viewed most favorably to the prevailing party, this testimony
should be presumed to have been so disbelieved.
In Hankscraft, the court announced agreement with the most
liberal products liability theories of the time. Strict liability,
itself, is used to make the plaintiff's case easier to prove. In
dealing so curtly with a circumstantial evidence case and view-
ing the concept of "defect" in a manner which does not lend
itself to circumstantial proof as well as a broader concept might,
the court would seem to have retreated from the direction in
which it was heading when it adopted strict liability. Certainly,
to make a manufacturer an absolute insurer of safety under all
conditions would be undesirable, and would loose those creaking
proverbial floodgates so feared by cautious jurists everywhere.
However, strict product liability is a young area of the law, con-
43. 276 Minn. 390, 150 N.W.2d 556 (1967) (an action in warranty
and negligence).
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ceived in liberality toward the conslumer. In such an area, an
adverse decision should be accompanied by guidelines for future
growth so as not to stifle its original purpose. Such guidelines
are not presented in this case.'
Real Property: Broker's Commission Under
Exclusive Sale Contract Denied for
Conditional Sale Secured by Seller
Plaintiff realty company sued defendant motel owner for
recovery of a broker's commission under an exclusive sale con-
tract. The contract entitled plaintiff to a commission on any
sale of the motel occurring within a six-month period, regardless
of who made the sale.1 Prior to the expiration of the six-month
contract, defendant entered into a written purchase agreement
conditioned on plaintiff's failure to sell the property. The Min-
nesota Supreme Court held that defendant's purchase agree-
ment with purchaser was not a sale within the meaning of his
exclusive sale contract with plaintiff and therefore, plaintiff was
not entitled to a commission.2 Gu6'im Realty, Incorporated v.
Hughes, - Minn. -, 169 N.W.2d 217 (1969).
A broker can recover a commission by proving that he was
either the procuring cause of the sale or that he had a con-
tactural right to the commission. 3 If the broker is the efficient
and effective cause of bringing about the actual sale, he is en-
titled to a commission under the procuring cause theory.4 Un-
1. Codefendant, a realty company, was party to a six-month
exclusive listing contract with the motel owner that expired the day the
contract between plaintiff and motel owner commenced. This code-
fendant had shown the purchaser the real estate and after expiration
of its listing agreement, defendant brought the purchaser back to the
motel owner, arranged the purchase agreement which resulted in the
sale of the motel, and was paid a commission by the owner.
2. Plaintiff also alleged that defendant realty company had in-
tentionally interfered with plaintiff's contract rights; defendant counter-
claimed that plaintiff had fraudulently induced the motel owner to
enter into an exclusive sale contract. The district court found in favor
of the defendant on the first count and in favor of the plaintiff on the
counterclaim.
3. In the instant case the court deals only with the contract theory.
4. Rees-Thomson-Scroggins, Inc. "v. Nelson, 276 Minn. 453, 150
N.W.2d 568 (1968); The Spring Co. v. Holle, 248 Minn. 51, 78 N.W.2d
315 (1956); Neumeier v. Sperzel, 223 Minn. 60, 25 N.W.2d 651 (1946);
Hubachek v. Hazzard, 83 Minn. 437, 86 N.W. 415 (1901).
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der contract theory, the general rule is that the broker is entitled
to a commission once he has fulfilled the terms of his contract.5
The contract involved is usually one of three basic brokerage
contracts; a general listing, an exclusive agency or an exclusive
right to sell. In determining which type of contract is involved,
the courts construe the agreement against the broker.6
Of these three basic contracts, a general listing is the most
favorable to the owner since he may revoke at any time prior
to performance. The revocation is effective regardless of the
efforts extended by the broker, as long as the owner is acting
in good faith. The owner is also free to list his property with
other brokers, sell it himself or withdraw it from the market
without paying the broker's commission. An exclusive agency
to sell is less favorable to the owner since it entitles the broker
to a commission on any sale other than one made by the owner.7
An exclusive right to sell is the least favorable to an owner.
This contract provides for a commission on a sale made by any-
one, including the owner." The harsh nature of exclusive sale
contracts, together with the court's tendency to construe all real
estate contracts against the broker, has led to a requirement of
an explicit provision for a commission in the event of sale by
the owner before the broker will be able to collect.
"Exclusive sale contract" is the general term used for all
brokerage contracts that provide for a commission on any sale, re-
gardless of the procuring cause. However, the terms vary from
agreement to agreement. Owner and broker can agree that the
commission will be dependent upon various conditions, 0 whether
express or implied.' In order to determine if the broker is en-
titled to his commission, the court must decide whether the spe-
cific terms have been met.12
5. E.g., Stromer v. Browning, 50 Cal. Rptr. 796 (C.A. 1966); E.A.
Strout Realty Agency, Inc. v. McKelvy, 424 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. App. 1968).
6. E.g., Robert H. Kent & Co. v. Burton, 248 Md. 693, 237 A.2d
736 (1968); Boutelle v. Chrislaw, 34 Wis. 2d 665, 150 N.W.2d 486 (1967).
7. E.g., Keller Corp. v. Cable, 207 Minn. 336, 291 N.W. 515 (1940);
Zifcak v. Monroe, 249 A.2d 893 (R.I. 1968).
8. E.g., Carlsen v. Zane, 261 Cal. App. 2d 399, 67 Cal. Rptr. 747(1968); Confer Bros. v. Colbrath, 149 Minn. 259, 183 N.W. 524 (1921).
9. A good example is the instant case where one exclusive sale
contract entitled a previous broker to a commission of "any sale or
contract for the sale or exchange" of the motel and the other entitled
plaintiff to a commission on "any sale" of the motel. 169 N.W.2d 217.
10. See Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843(1968) where the court limits the contract to what is conscionable.
11. Larson v. Syverson, 166 N.W.2d 424 (S.D. 1969).
12. Wahl v. Hutto, 249 S.C. 500, 155 S.E.2d 1 (1967)..
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The cause of the difficulty arising under exclusive sale con-
tracts is the reluctance of the owner to pay the broker's commis-
sion when the owner has found a purchaser willing to negotiate
for the sale of the property.'3 This reaction is understandable.
Had the owner anticipated selling the property himself, he would
not have contracted with the broker or he would have contracted
for an exclusive agency. If, after signing the exclusive sale
contract, the owner has an opportunity to sell it himself, he may
attempt to postpone the sale until the expiration of the brokerage
agreement rather than incur the expense of the broker's commis-
sion. The effectiveness of this arrangement to avoid a commis-
sion depends on the court's interpretation of the word "sale"
in the brokerage contract.
The approach taken by a large majority of American courts
focuses on the agreement between the vendor and purchaser.
If the agreement is legally binding and enforceable under the
Statute of Frauds, it constitutes a sale and the broker is entitled
to his commission. 14 In these jurisdictions, the vendor and pur-
chaser can avoid the broker's commission through an oral agree-
ment,'5 an option revocable at the will of either party 6 or nego-
tiation in some other way that does not produce a legally en-
forceable instrument.'7
The second approach, developed by Louisiana courts, adopts
a narrow meaning of sale and considers the effect of the agree-
ment between the vendor and purchaser on the authority of the
broker to sell the property. Thus, a purchase agreement con-
tingent on the broker's failure to sell the property before the
expiration of his contract is not a sale since it does not affect
the broker's authority to sell the property.'8 Louisiana brokers
have protected themselves against this rule by drawing broker-
age contracts that expressly require the owner to refer all pro-
spective purchasers to the realtor. 9
13. See generally Comment, Colorado Real Etate Broker Listing
Contracts, 35 U. CoLo. L. REV. 205 (1963).
14. See, e.g., Dobbs v. Conyers, 36 Ga. App. 511, 137 S.E. 298
(1927); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Lamar, 148 Mo. App. 353, 128 S.W. 20
(1910); Lewis v. Dahl, 108 Utah 486, 161 P.2d 362 (1945).
15. Hartig v. Schrader, 190 Ky. 511, 227 S.W. 815 (1921).
16. York v. Nash, 42 Ore. 321, 71 P. 59 (1903).
17. Hawks v. Moore, 27 Ga. App. 555, 109 S.E. 807 (1921).
18. See Clesi v. Cooney, 164 La. 657, 114 So. 584 (1927). At most
the agreement eliminates one possible purchaser from all potential pur-
chasers.19. See Doll v. Thornill, 6 So. 2d 793 (La. App. 1942) where the
Louisiana court upheld such a provision in connection with a factual
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In Gudim, rather than considering the enforceability of the
purchase agreement, the Minnesota court adopted the Louisiana
theory. A narrow definition of sale was established which did
not include contracts to sell.20 In determining what constituted
a sale-a prerequisite for a commission according to the terms
of the contract-the court examined whether the broker's author-
ity to sell was affected by the purchase agreement.21 Plaintiff
contended that Minnesota courts had previously followed the
majority rule in such cases. In Francis v. Baker,22 the execution
of a binding agreement to sell, regardless of any conditions
precedent, was held sufficient to entitle a broker to a commission
under an exclusive sale contract. The court distinguished this
early decision, however, because the condition in Gudim-the
broker's failure to sell the property prior to the expiration of his
contract-was out of the control of both contracting parties.
Further, the court suggested that an express provision that the
owner refer all prospects to the realtor would be enforceable
and would provide Minnesota brokers with the same protection
available to brokers in Louisiana. 23
In some ways the Louisiana approach is preferable to the
more popular practice of determining the enforceability of the
vendor-purchaser agreement. First, although both approaches
emphasize the specific terms of the brokerage agreement, the
Louisiana approach encourages broker and owner to employ
straightforward, literal terms which clearly define respective
rights and responsibilities at the time the contract is made. The
other approach often gives a specific word or phrase a sophis-
ticated meaning which may not have been contemplated by
the parties at the time the agreement was drawn.2
4
Second, the Louisiana test gives substance to the exclusive
sale contract. The facts in Gudim are an example of one of
the many ways owners have attempted to avoid a commission
and limit the effectiveness of an exclusive sale contract.25 A
provision that the owner refer prospects to the broker seems to
situation very similar to that of Gudim. Accord, Donlon v. Babin, 44 So.
2d 134 (La. App. 1950).
20. 169 N.W.2d at 218.
21. Id. at 219.
22. Francis v. Baker, 45 Minn. 83, 47 N.W. 452 (1890).
23. 169 N.W.2d at 219.
24. See text accompanying notes 31-33 infra.
25. If the owner wishes to reserve the right to sell the property, he
and the broker can agree to an "exclusive agency contract, see note 7
supra.
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protect the broker against the owner who tries to avoid payment
of the commission.
One weakness of the court's opinion is the limitation upon
what constitutes a sale. The court relied on Morrison v. St.
Paul Northern Pacific Railway,28 a decision which defined a sale
as an "entire and absolute transfer" of the thing sold.27  Other
courts have extended the scope of a sale; for example, in real
estate transactions, sale has been held to include the execution
of a future contract to sell, 28 the execution of an agreement for
sale where there has been no actual transfer of title,29 and the
conveyance of title or the execution and delivery of a valid and
enforceable contract of sale.30 In commercial transactions, pro-
visions of the Uniform Commercial Code tend to diminish the
distinction between a present sale and a future sale by generaliz-
ing the application of words like "contract" and "agreement"
and by emphasizing the rights of the parties rather than the stage
of the transaction.3 1
Given the language of current exclusive sale contracts, au-
thorized by the Board of Realtors,32 it is probable that the effect
of Gudim on the realtors will be limited. These contracts, which
make the commission payable upon sale or contract of sale and
require the owner to refer all inqudring parties to the broker,
26. Morrison v. St. Paul N. P. Ry. Co., 63 Minn. 75, 65 N.W. 141
(1895).
27. Id.
28. Klipper v. Schlossberg, 96 N.3.L. 397, 115 A. 345 (1921).
29. Maxwell v. Staulcup, 103 N.J.L. 509, 138 A. 201 (1927).
30. See, e.g., Dobbs v. Conyers, 36 Ga. App. 511, 137 S.E. 298
(1927); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Lamar, 148 Mo. App. 353, 128 S.W. 20
(1910); Lewis v. Dahl, 108 Utah 486, 161 P.2d 362 (1945).
31. See UNirom CoumMmcIAL ConE § 2-106(1) and official com-
ment; Mmmr. STAT. § 336.2 (1967).
32. I (owner) agree to pay you (broker) the commission...
upon any sale or contract for the sale of said real estate while
this agreement remains in force, whether such sale be made by
yourselves or by myself at the price and upon the terms stated,
or at a different price or upon othier terms accepted by me.
It is further agreed that upon any sale or contract for the sale
of said real estate made by me within six months next after
the termination of this agreement to any person to whom, dur-
ing the period of the listing, you shall have shown or offered
this property of which I shall have been notified in writing, or
to any person who during the period of this listing makes in-
quiry of me regarding this real estate, I will pay you the full
rate of commission... and I further agree to furnish you com-
plete information regarding such inquiry promptly after receiv-
ing same.
Exclusive Sale Contract available from the Greater Minneapolis Board
of Realtors.
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were specifically approved by the Gudim court.33 The theory
which entitles a broker to his commission if he is the procuring
cause of the sale also limits the effect of the decision.3 4 Had
Gudim Realty been able to establish that it was the direct and
procuring cause of the sale, it would have been entitled to a
commission regardless of the terms of the contract. At best,
Gudim is yet another reminder to brokers that the stability of
their profession depends on brokerage agreements containing
special provisions to provide for various circumstances. 5
33. 169 N.W.2d 217.
34. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
35. Comment, supra note 13, at 220.
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